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COMMENT
Internet Gambling, Electronic Cash & Money
Laundering: The Unintended Consequences
of a Monetary Control Scheme
Mark D. Schopper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs have exploited technological advances and
consumer demand to build a global gambling market on the In-
ternet.  In response, members of the U.S. Congress have repeat-
edly attempted to pass legislation prohibiting Internet gambling.
Although all federal legislative attempts to place an outright ban
on Internet gambling have failed, attempts to find an enforceable
method of prohibition continue.  Congress’s most recent attempt to
prevent Americans from gambling on the Internet is contained in
proposed legislation, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act (UIGFPA), which would institute a monetary con-
trol scheme in the United States preventing the use of credit cards
and other bank instruments for Internet gambling.1  The raison
d’etre for this legislative effort is purportedly to prevent money
laundering.
This comment examines the monetary control scheme being
considered by Congress, and the possible consequences of using it
as a method of enforcing a prohibition on Internet gambling.  To
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2002, Chapman University School of Law.  The au-
thor would like to thank Kelly M. Craig (Senior Notes & Comments and Co-Executive Edi-
tor) for providing technical expertise, valuable editorial suggestions, and never-ending
encouragement toward the production of this comment.  The author would also like to
thank Professor Tom W. Bell and Debra Peterson for their exceptionally helpful input.
Copyright 2002, Mark D. Schopper, all rights reserved.
1 H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001).
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this end, the comment identifies related issues involved in In-
ternet gambling, money laundering, and the emergent technology
of electronic money.  This comment will seek to show that the cur-
rent proposal pending in Congress to ban the use of credit cards
and other payment systems as a means of preventing Internet
gambling will not only fail to achieve its intended result, but may
in fact unleash market forces that could have vast and unintended
consequences—including the promotion of both Internet gambling
and money laundering.
For a glimpse of the likely results of the UIGFPA or similar
monetary control schemes, consider the following scenario:  more
than one million Americans per day log on to the Internet and
play casino-style games or make sports wagers for real money.
The federal government moves to prohibit this activity.  After nu-
merous failed attempts at passing prohibition legislation, the gov-
ernment develops what appears to be an “effective” method of
achieving this goal:  a monetary control scheme that would effec-
tively make it impossible for Americans to fund their Internet
gambling activities.  To this end, the government passes legisla-
tion banning the use of credit cards, checks, and electronic funds
in Internet gambling.  It claims these measures are necessary to
thwart criminals and terrorists from laundering the proceeds of
their illegal activity through Internet gambling sites.  Millions of
Americans, denied the use of their credit cards for Internet gam-
bling, seek alternative funding mechanisms.
The market quickly realizes that an alternative mechanism
already exists in the form of electronic money, and gamblers begin
using it to place bets or play casino-style games on the Internet.
This alternative method of payment is completely anonymous, un-
traceable, and more secure than a credit card.  Unlike current
payment systems, such as credit cards, the new payment mecha-
nism allows for immediate payoffs, much like in “brick and mor-
tar” casinos.  Internet gambling therefore becomes even more
attractive to potential online gamblers.  Indeed, the numerous ad-
vantages of this alternative payment mechanism lead to its use
for other transactions on the Internet.  As a result, the alternative
payment method enjoys widespread use, and it soon becomes a
commercial success.
And here is the clincher:  this alternative method of payment
is perhaps the most powerful and untraceable money-laundering
tool ever imagined by criminals.  Additionally, once the alterna-
tive payment method “catches on,” it would be nearly impossible
to stop its use without pulling the plug on the entire Internet (and
maybe not even then).  Current congressional efforts to ban credit
cards and other payment methods for use in Internet gambling
2002]Internet Gambling, Electronic Cash & Money Laundering 305
could facilitate a consumer shift to this alternative method of pay-
ment–“electronic money.”2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Internet Gambling
To gamble on the Internet, consumers use personal computers
to access Internet gambling websites offering sports wagers or ca-
sino-style games of skill or chance.3  Internet gamblers locate
gambling websites much the same way as they would any other
website:  through search engines, online advertising, or a variety
of other methods.  The gambler generally has two types of gam-
bling from which to choose—casino-style games, “such as black-
jack, poker, slot machines, and roulette,”4 and sports wagering.5
Most Internet gambling sites require the gambler to fill out
an online registration form,6 and to open an account with the gam-
bling site or a related bank.7  Once the account is established, the
gambler needs to fund the account; payment can be made via
credit cards, debit cards, wire transfers, checks, smart cards, or
other electronic payment systems.8  Until recently, approximately
ninety-five percent of Internet bets or wagers have been made
through use of credit cards.9  The Internet gambler uses a credit
card to fund a “front money” account with the Internet casino or
related bank,10 which can then be used to wager up to the amount
of the available balance.  A gambler’s winnings are usually “dis-
tributed as checks in the mail, bank drafts, or credits to the [gam-
bler’s] credit or debit card account.”11
As of 2001, the burgeoning Internet gambling industry was
valued at approximately two billion dollars (U.S.) annually.12  This
2 The terms electronic money (e-money), electronic cash, and digital cash are used
interchangeably throughout this comment. Various names have evolved for electronic
money:  It is referred to as digital cash, electronic cash, digital money, cyberpayments, and
cybercash.  Sarah N. Welling & Andy G. Rickman, Cyberlaundering: The Risks, The Re-
sponses, 50 FLA. L. REV. 295, 298 (1998).
3 See ANTHONY CABOT, THE INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT IV 5-12 (2001).
4 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT at 5-3 (1999), available at
http://www.govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.; CABOT, supra note 3, at 26-27.
8 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-3.
9 See Kevin Ferguson, Wells Fargo Bars Use of ATM, Credit Cards for Online Gam-
bling, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 15, 2000, at 3E, available at 2000 WL 8216923 (quoting
Internet gambling analyst Sebastian Sinclair).
10 CABOT, supra note 3, at 26-27.
11 Michael P. Kailus, Note, Do Not Bet on Unilateral Prohibition of Internet Gambling
to Eliminate Cyber-Casinos, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (1999).
12 Jon Baumgarten, Alec Farr, & Susan Brinkerhoff Proskauer Rose LLP, Congress
Again Confronts Internet Gambling, CYBERSPACE LAW. vol. 6 No. 6, at 13 (Sept. 2001) [here-
inafter Congress Again Confronts].  Unless otherwise indicated, all currency figures are in
U.S. dollars.
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figure is projected to exceed six billion dollars by 2004, with about
half of this figure originating from gamblers in the United
States.13  The number of Internet gambling businesses has multi-
plied in a few short years to at least two hundred,14 offering a com-
bined total of more than 1400 websites at which a patron can
gamble.15  These online gambling websites are accessible to any-
one with Internet access—anywhere in the world.16  The physical
location of these “virtual casinos” is presently outside of the
United States, in places like Antigua or the Netherlands Antil-
les.17  The main reason for the lack of domestic Internet gambling
sites is that ambiguity in U.S. federal law currently makes it un-
clear whether some forms of Internet gambling are legal.
The federal government has traditionally left decisions re-
garding the legalization of gambling to the states.18  Furthermore,
courts have generally held that the regulation of gambling is a
right reserved for the states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.19  Nevertheless, there are federal statutes that apply
to gambling.20  Thus, it is conceivable that the federal government
could regulate Internet gambling and, in fact, Congress has made
numerous attempts to do so.  Citing the rapid expansion of In-
ternet gambling and the Internet’s borderless nature as potent
reasons for intervention, members of Congress have attempted to
bring this form of gambling under federal control.
From 1995 to the present, legislation has been introduced in
both the House of Representatives and Senate to prohibit Internet
gambling.21  Internet gambling opponents claim that prohibition is
necessary to deal with, among other things, social problems and
criminal activities linked to gambling.22  However, members of
Congress opposed to Internet gambling have been unsuccessful
with their legislative attempts to place an outright ban on this
13 Id.
14 CABOT, supra note 3, at 54.
15 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12.
16 See CABOT, supra note 3, at 5-12.
17 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12.
18 Stevie A. Kish, Note, Betting on the Net: An Analysis of the Government’s Role in
Addressing Internet Gambling, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 449, 450 (1999).
19 Peter Brown, Regulation of Cybercasinos and Internet Gambling, 547 PLI/Pat 9, 14
(1999).
20 See, e.g., The Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2001).
21 See Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12; Joseph M. Kelly, Internet Gambling
Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 134-150 (2000).  As of the writing of this comment, two
bills are currently making their way through the U.S. Congress.  H.R. 556, 107th Cong.
(2001) (sponsored by Rep. Leach (R-Iowa)); H.R. 3215, 107th Cong. (2001) (sponsored by
Rep. Goodlatte (R-Virginia)).  Congress is expected to consider the legislation in 2002.
Tony Batt, Leach Takes Aim at Web Gambling, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. Nov. 23, 2001, at 1D,
available at 2001 WL 9543589 [hereinafter Batt, Leach Takes Aim].
22 For a good discussion of the perceived dangers of Internet gambling, see Theresa E.
Loscalzo & Stephen J. Shapiro, Internet Gambling Policy: Prohibition Versus Regulation, 7
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J 11 (2000).
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activity.  Consequently, some members of Congress are now trying
to prevent the use of certain bank instruments for Internet gam-
bling.  Before discussing the merits of this proposed monetary con-
trol scheme, it will be helpful to understand the political climate
in the U.S. Congress regarding Internet gambling, and how prohi-
bition efforts have arrived at this monetary control methodology.
B. Efforts to Prohibit Internet Gambling
There have been a number of unsuccessful attempts to pass
Internet gambling prohibition legislation.  These unsuccessful at-
tempts have varied in both approach and stated purpose.  In fact,
the legislative approach has evolved significantly over the past
seven years, as opponents of Internet gambling have gradually
come to realize that Internet gambling is extremely difficult to
regulate.
The first proposal to prohibit Internet gambling was intro-
duced by Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) as part of the 1995 Crime
Prevention Act.23  It targeted individual gamblers and would have
imposed a harsh one-year prison sentence.24  The proposal died in
committee.25  In 1997, Senator Kyl proposed the Internet Gam-
bling Prohibition Act, again attempting to criminalize Internet
gambling.26  This bill was more successful than Senator Kyl’s pre-
vious attempt.  After undergoing a series of revisions, a version
was approved by the Senate in July 1998,27 but failed in the House
of Representatives.  Undaunted, Senator Kyl reintroduced the bill
in March 1999,28 and the Senate unanimously passed a revised
version.29  Nevertheless, the bill again died in the House of
Representatives.
Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia) has also intro-
duced legislation to prohibit Internet gambling.  His bill, the Com-
bating Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act,30 would
update the Wire Act.31  Courts have held that the current statu-
tory language restricts the applicability of the Wire Act to “sport-
23 See 141 CONG. REC. S19110-07 (1995) (overview of the Crime Prevention Act of
1995), available at 1995 WL 755393.
24 Id.  In addition to the prison sentence, the convicted individual’s computer equip-
ment would be confiscated. Id
25 Id.
26 See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997).
27 Compare S. 474 (introduced by Sen. Jon Kyl on March 19, 1997), with 144 Cong.
Rec. S8815 (1998) (Senate Bill 474 as passed by the Senate, July 23, 1998).
28 S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
29 See 145 CONG. REC. S14863-02 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999).
30 H.R. 3215, 107th Cong. (2001).
31 The Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. §1084 (2001).  The Wire Act provides criminal liability for
anyone who engages in “the business of betting or wagering” using:
[W]ire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign com-
merce of [1] bets or wagers or [2] information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of [3] a wire com-
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ing events or contests”, thus excluding casino-style games.32  The
proposed revisions to the Wire Act would include nearly every
type of gambling conducted over the Internet, including casino
style games.33  Unlike the Kyl bill, however, the Goodlatte legisla-
tion targets the offshore Internet casino operator rather than the
individual gambler.  A number of commentators contend that Rep-
resentative Goodlatte’s proposed legislation would be difficult to
enforce, and could be easily circumvented.34  In light of this view, a
third legislative approach, which targets the payment mecha-
nisms used by Internet gamblers, has surfaced in Congress.
C. Congress’s Monetary Control Schemes and Internet
Gambling
1. Efforts to Disrupt Payment Methods Used by Internet
Gamblers
In the National Gambling Impact Study Commission’s
(NGISC) 1999 report on gambling in America, the NGISC recom-
mended prohibition of Internet gambling to the President and
Congress.35  The NGISC recommended “the passage of legislation
stating that any credit card debts incurred while gambling on the
Internet are unrecoverable.”36  It also endorsed “the passage of leg-
islation prohibiting wire transfers to known Internet gambling
sites, or the banks who represent them.”37  The NGISC recom-
munication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of
bets or wagers.
Id.
32 In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., Internet Gambling Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 480-81
(E.D. La. 2001).
33 H.R. 3215.
34 E.g., Tony Batt, Bill to Ban Web-Based Gambling Toughened, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Nov. 2, 2001, at 1D (Las Vegas gaming expert and Internet gambling specialist, Anthony
Cabot, taking the position that Goodlatte’s bill will not stop the expansion of Internet gam-
bling); Peter Hardin, U.S. Backs Goodlatte Bill Barring Internet Gambling, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 2001, at A26 (Frank Catania, former Director of the New Jersey
Division of Gaming Enforcement, criticizing the bill, and Representative Robert Scott ques-
tioning whether the bill will be effective).
35 See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-12.
The Commission recommends to the President, Congress, and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) that the federal government should prohibit, without allowing new
exemptions or the expansion of existing federal exemptions to other jurisdictions,
Internet gambling not already authorized within the United States or among par-
ties in the United States and any foreign jurisdiction.  Further, the Commission
recommends that the President and Congress direct the DOJ to develop enforce-
ment strategies that include, but are not limited to, Internet service providers,
credit card providers, money transfer agencies, makers of wireless communica-
tions systems, and others who intentionally or unintentionally facilitate Internet
gambling transactions.  Because it crosses state lines, it is difficult for states to
adequately monitor and regulate such gambling.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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mended prohibition, in part due to its conclusion that Internet
gambling sites provide criminals with “easy” money-laundering
opportunities.38
Not long after the NGISC made its recommendations, Con-
gress began looking at this method of prohibiting Internet gam-
bling.  In May 2000, the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services introduced House Bill 4419,39 which included
language that would have made it illegal for an Internet gambling
operation to accept a bank instrument in connection with Internet
gambling.40  The logic underlying this scheme was that if the flow
of money to Internet gambling sites could be blocked, Internet
gambling would be effectively prohibited.  Representative John
LaFalce (D-New York), who cosponsored the bill, stated that the
bill offered the “only realistic approach for restricting the expan-
sion of Internet gambling by restricting the electronic payments
that make online betting and, thus, Internet gambling possible.”41
Although Congress did not enact House Bill 4419, its concept
has survived.  The idea of preventing Internet gambling by this
monetary control approach resurfaced shortly after the World
Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.  House and Senate negotiators agreed to include money-
laundering legislation in the Anti-Terrorism Package to be sent to
President Bush.42  Included in this legislation was a provision
prohibiting payments for wagers to Internet gambling sites.  The
prohibited payment methods would have included credit cards,
checks, or funds transferred electronically.43  The House Financial
Services Committee pushed for the bill, which would have made it
illegal for banks or credit card companies to intentionally process
illegal Internet gambling transactions.44  The inclusion of the In-
ternet gambling provision was reportedly for the purpose of
preventing money laundering linked to terrorism.45  The bill rep-
resented a tactical shift by Internet gambling opponents; unlike
the bills proposed by Senator Kyl and others to prohibit “Internet
gambling,” the inclusion of anti-Internet gambling language in the
Anti-Terrorism Package was to prevent “money laundering.”
The Justice Department, including the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI), supported the legislation.46  Some legislators
38 Id. at 5-6.
39 H.R. 4419, 106th Cong. (2000).
40 Id.
41 Congressional Panel Seeks to Ban Credit, Debit Card Use for Online Gambling,
CARD NEWS, June 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4447497.
42 Money Laundering Monitor, Business Crimes Bulletin: Compliance and Litigation,
vol. 8 No. 9, at 2 (Oct. 2001).
43 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12.
44 Money Laundering Monitor, supra note 42.
45 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12.
46 Money Laundering Monitor, supra note 42.
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pushed for even stronger legislation;47 they sought to prohibit all
forms of Internet gambling, including Internet gambling not con-
sidered illegal in the jurisdiction in which it was located.48  The
proposed monetary control scheme and its justification also had
critics.  Not everyone in Congress liked the idea of prohibiting In-
ternet gambling through the money-laundering legislation.  For
example, Representative Ron Paul (R-Texas) and other legislators
criticized the legislation, arguing that the connection between In-
ternet gambling and terrorism was too weak for such legislation to
be a part of the broader money-laundering package.49  Representa-
tives of both the financial services industry and the gambling in-
dustry, who also opposed the legislation, joined these legislators.
Financial industries, which would have been impacted by the
prohibition, opposed the bill, maintaining that it would be difficult
to enforce.50  Credit card giants like Visa International (Visa),
MasterCard International Inc., Bank One Corp., and Bank of
America supported this contention and lobbied against the legisla-
tion, claiming that it simply would not work.51  They pointed out
that individuals purchasing “electronic cash” with their credit
cards for use in online gambling could easily bypass the proposed
prohibitions.52  Moreover, one Visa senior vice president predicted
that such “alternative forms of payment will become the payment
system of choice for Internet gambling.”53  Visa representatives
also claimed the bill would place an undue burden on Visa and
other credit card companies.54  Representatives of the gambling in-
dustry reported to a congressional panel that a ban on Internet
gambling would be unsuccessful for a number of reasons, claiming
that the Internet is a borderless medium, and that alternative
47 Id.  Representative John LaFalce, who has also introduced anti-Internet gambling
legislation in the past, for example, 147 CONG. REC. H4377-06 (2001) (introducing House
Bill 2579), available at 2001 WL 819229, was behind the push to add the “legal gambling”
language to the bill.  The LaFalce language would have made it illegal for states to legalize
Internet gambling within their borders. Money Laundering Monitor, supra note 42.
48 Money Laundering Monitor, supra note 42.
49 Tony Batt, House Panel Oks Internet Gambling Restrictions Move, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Oct. 12, 2001, at 7A, available at 2001 WL 9541371.
50 Money Laundering Monitor, supra note 42.
51 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12; see also Kathleen Day, Money-Launder-
ing Bill Passes: House Strips Measure of Web Gambling Limit Opposed by Banks, WASH.
POST, Oct. 18, 2001, at E1, available at 2001 WL 29162604.
52 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12; see also Gambling on The Internet: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. of Financial
Services, 106th Cong. (2001) (written Statement of Mark MacCarthy, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Public Policy Visa U.S.A.), available at 2001 WL 21757109 [hereinafter MacCarthy
Statement].
53 MacCarthy Statement, supra note 52.
54 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12; see also MacCarthy Statement, supra
note 52.
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payment systems were already available for those who wished to
gamble online.55
Apparently, the opposition to the inclusion of an Internet
gambling prohibition in the money-laundering bill was effective
because the provision was stripped from the bill eventually
presented to the President.56  Undaunted, many in Congress are
still attempting to prohibit Internet gambling through similar leg-
islation.  As of the writing of this comment, a bill currently being
considered by Congress aims to prevent the use of credit cards and
other bank instruments for Internet gambling.57
2. Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act
United States Representative James Leach (R-Iowa) spon-
sored the UIGFPA.58  The stated purpose of the legislation is “[t]o
prevent the use of certain bank instruments for unlawful Internet
gambling, and for other purposes.”59  The UIGFPA would prohibit
financial service organizations, such as credit card providers, from
collecting the gambling debts of customers who use credit cards to
gamble online.60  The bill would also impose penalties on financial
institutions that knowingly participate in Internet gambling
transactions.61  The civil and criminal penalties include fines and
up to five years in prison.62
The UIGFPA, lists, inter alia, the following congressional
finding:  “Internet gambling conducted through offshore jurisdic-
tions has been identified by United States law enforcement offi-
cials as a significant money laundering vulnerability.”63
Additionally, Representative Leach, in his testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, stated, “In-
ternet gambling specifically is a particularly attractive method to
launder money because of the heightened level of anonymity and a
virtual lack of governmental regulation.”64
The concern that Internet gambling could become a “haven”
for money laundering is justified.  In the words of one commenta-
55 Congress Again Confronts, supra note 12.
56 Day, supra note 51.
57 H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 H.R. 556 § 5.  This section states, in pertinent part, that financial intuitions may
not engage in “Paying, transferring, or collecting on any check, draft, or other instrument
drawn on any depository institution with the actual knowledge that any person is violating
section 3(a) of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act in connection with
such check, draft, or other instrument.” Id.
61 H.R. 556.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Illegal Gambling: Hearing on H.R. 556 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. of the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of U.S. Rep. Leach), available at
2001 WL 1519433.
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tor, “The greatest criminal threat posed by the blossoming virtual
gaming industry is the unprecedented potential it presents for
criminal elements seeking to launder their ill-gotten gains.”65  The
NGISC concluded that Internet gambling might provide an “easy
means” for criminals to launder their illicit funds.66  Additionally,
the FBI claims that offshore Internet gambling sites are a great
resource for money launderers, and has reportedly investigated
two websites that it claims were being used by organized crime to
launder money.67  Moreover, beyond Internet gambling there ap-
pears to be a general link between money laundering and com-
puter technology.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN),68 a branch of the Treasury Department, has found evi-
dence that computers and the Internet in general are being used
to facilitate money laundering.69
Regarding enforceability, many members of Congress gener-
ally view the approach of the UIGFPA to be the best method of
preventing Americans from gambling at offshore websites.70  At
first glance, this method of enforcement seems logical.  Credit
cards provide consumers with a mechanism to fund their online
gambling.  Theoretically, if you cut off the funding source, Ameri-
cans will not be able to gamble online.  However, the monetary
control scheme has much broader implications than its supporters
realize.  Indeed, the UIGFPA may unintentionally promote an
anonymous form of e-money as a replacement of credit cards for
Internet gambling.  Ironically, this form of e-money could poten-
65 Jon Mills, Internet Casinos: A Sure Bet for Money Laundering, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L.
77, 78 (2000).
66 See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-6.  The NGISC report describes the
possible method of laundering money via Internet gambling as follows:  “To launder money,
a person need only deposit money into an offshore account, use those funds to gamble, lose
a small percentage of the original funds, then cash out the remaining funds.” Id.
67 Money Laundering Monitor, supra note 42.
68 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is an arm of the Treasury Depart-
ment.  FinCEN, About FinCEN/FAQS, at http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen/af_faqs.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2002).  FinCEN states its mission as follows:
[T]o support law enforcement investigative efforts and foster interagency and
global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes; and to pro-
vide U.S. policy makers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide trends
and patterns.  FinCEN works toward those ends through information collection
analysis and sharing, as well as technological assistance and innovative, cost-ef-
fective implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act and other Treasury authorities.
FinCEN, Mission, at http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen/af_mission.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2002).
69 See generally FINCEN, U.S. Treas. Dept., A SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, ELEC-
TRONIC BANKING AND INTERNET GAMING, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (2000),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen/e-cash.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, SURVEY OF
ELECTRONIC CASH].
70 Internet Gambling Bills Should Be Enacted Separately, Leach Says, WASH. IN-
TERNET DAILY, Nov. 30, 2001, available at http://www.offshoretoday.com/NEWS/19892_8.
html [hereinafter Leach Says].
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tially lead to an actual increase in Internet gambling and money
laundering.
D. Money Laundering
Money laundering is a process through which criminals legiti-
mize proceeds derived from illegal activity.71  It is a serious form of
criminal activity, not only in the United States, but worldwide.72
Between five hundred billion and two trillion dollars in illicit
funds are estimated to be laundered every year.73  Money launder-
ing has been shown to facilitate all types of nefarious activity, in-
cluding “terrorism, fraud, robbery, corruption, bribery, extortion,
immigrant smuggling, kidnapping, and tax evasion.”74
The actual process of laundering money is a complicated
method of disguising the origin of money so that it appears to have
been derived from legal activity.  This legitimization of money is
generally carried out in a three-stage process:  (1) the placement
stage, (2) the layering stage, and (3) the integration stage.75
“Placement” requires physically moving the illicit funds into fi-
nancial institutions or the retail economy.76  The second stage,
“layering,” generally involves multiple wire transfers of the funds,
or other complex financial transactions.77  The layering process
disguises or eliminates any audit trail, thereby making it difficult
for law enforcement to trace or pinpoint the origin of the funds.78
The final stage, “integration,” involves reintroducing the funds
back into the economy to appear as though they were legitimate.79
The integration of illicit funds into a legitimate economy is diffi-
cult for law enforcement to detect without an audit trail estab-
lished during the placement or layering stage.80
Law enforcement agencies in the United States rely on a com-
prehensive financial transaction reporting system imposed on
U.S. banks and other financial institutions to detect and prevent
money laundering.81  Under the Bank Secrecy Act, banks and
other financial institutions are required to record and report fi-
71 Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology On Money Laun-
dering, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7-8 (2001).
72 See Mills, supra note 65, at 77.
73 Rueda, supra note 71, at 7.
74 Id. at 8.
75 FinCEN, U.S. Treas. Dept., Suspicious Activity Reporting and Casinos, at http://
www.treas.gov/fincen/sarcasin.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
76 Id.  “During placement, the money is most vulnerable to detection and seizure.  To
assist in the placement stage, the funds may be initially smuggled across a nation’s borders
and placed into financial institutions located in foreign countries.” Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 ROGER C. MOLANDER ET AL., CYBERPAYMENTS AND MONEY LAUNDERING 6 (Rand
1998).
81 Rueda, supra note 71, at 8-9.
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nancial transactions to the federal government.82  The information
supplied by these financial institutions creates a “paper trail,”
which is then used by law enforcement to “trace laundered funds
to the illegal activity from which they were originally derived.”83
E. Electronic Money
1. E-Money
Since at least 1992, a process had been contemplated that
would allow a person to “transfer money (or credentials) over an
electronic network and obtain a service without the service pro-
vider ever knowing the actual identity of the individual but with
the assurance that money would be received for the service or that
the individual had the appropriate credentials to receive the ser-
vice.”84  With the advent of e-commerce, and a corresponding de-
mand for an efficient form of online payment, this process has
materialized in the form of electronic money.
Electronic money is a digital representation of money that can
be placed on a computer hard drive, smart card, or other device
with memory, including cellular phones and other electronic com-
munication devices.85  Electronic money payment schemes, which
currently consist of smart cards and computer-based e-money, al-
low for the storage and redemption of financial value.86  Simply
put, electronic money is a money replacement based on encryption
technologies,87 which disguise the electronic information so that
only the intended recipient can access its meaning.88  In the con-
text of e-money, the information that forms the basis of the money
can be encrypted to a level that makes it completely anonymous
and untraceable—even to its issuer.89
The process of obtaining and using electronic money is
straightforward.  A consumer purchases e-money with a form of
conventional money or credit.  The e-money can then be stored on
a smart card or memory-based electronic device until the con-
82 Id.
83 Id. at 8.
84 Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: (What
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 51 (2001).
85 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 15.
86 Id.; see also Dreams of a Cashless Society: Virtual Money v the Real Thing: It Re-
mains a Challenge to Connect the Futuristic Payment Methods to a 14th-Century Banking
System, ECONOMIST, May 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7318797 (Reportedly, mobile-phone
users in countries like Germany, Austria, and Spain can already send money using their
phones with a service called Paybox.).
87 Rueda, supra note 71, at 36.
88 Id. at 17-18.
89 See Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 322.  DigiCash, one of the first e-money
providers, offered encryption technology so strong that it could not track how its customers
used the e-money, making the currency completely anonymous. Id.
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sumer is ready to spend it.90  With computer-based e-money, a gov-
ernment or private business issues an electronic coin or note that
“represents a claim against the issuer and can be redeemed in ex-
change for traditional money (e.g., dollars).”91  Once the coin or
note has been issued, it can be used online over wires or wireless
technology.92  Unlike credit cards, this coin or note can be used
without the assistance of a bank or other traditional financial
institution.93
Another form of e-money is based on “smart-card” technology.
A smart card resembles a credit card in physical form.94  After a
consumer purchases a smart card, he or she can then load it with
electronic money at a “vending machine, bank, ATM, personal
computer over the Internet, or through a specially equipped tele-
phone.”95  Once the e-money is loaded on the card, the money can
then be spent over the Internet or through other communication
devices.96
Consumers can spend e-money online, much the same as they
do cash at the local shopping mall.  Individuals can also use e-
money in anonymous peer-to-peer transactions.  In this regard, e-
money is essentially an electronic form of real-world cash.  E-
money has many advantages over real cash, though.  For example,
because e-money lacks the geographical constraints of traditional
cash,97 one can transmit electronic money to another country as
easily as transmitting it across the street.98  Electronic money is
efficient and economical to store and transmit, which ultimately
lowers the cost of exchange.99  Additionally, it offers a number of
advantages over credit cards, including lower transaction costs,
immediate transaction processing, and a reduced potential for
fraud.100  Although one risks having his or her identity stolen with
credit cards, identity theft is not an issue with electronic money.
Because e-money can be encrypted and used anonymously over
the Internet, it offers significantly better privacy than credit cards
90 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 15.
91 David D. Friedman & Kerry L. Macintosh, The Cash of the Twenty-First Century,
17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 273, 278 (2001).
92 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 15.
93 Id.; Michael Anastasio, The Enforceability of Internet Gambling Debts: Laws, Poli-
cies, and Causes of Action, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 19 (2001).
94 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 15.
95 Wendy J. Weimer, Note and Comment, Cyberlaundering: An International Cache
for Microchip Money, 13 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 199, 223 (2000-2001).
96 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 15.
97 See Friedman & Macintoch, supra note 91, at 279.
98 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Pay-
ment Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 56 (1996).
99 See Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 91, at 280.
100 Rueda, supra note 71, at 29; Declan McCullagh, Digging Those Digicash Blues,
WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,44507,00.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2002).
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and even traditional cash.101  In contrast, “credit cards and checks
are not anonymous” because they leave an audit trail that can be
followed and that can identify one or more of the parties to the
transaction in question.102
With all of the obvious benefits of electronic money, it is easy
to see why commentators believe it has the potential to revolution-
ize the modern economy.103  Some commentators predict “[t]he
transition from a paper-based monetary system to an electronic
payments system will reduce transaction costs, expand markets,
and empower individuals.”104  This is high praise.  Indeed, elec-
tronic money has received such laudatory praise from pundits and
commentators that it could lead one to believe it is exactly what
the consumers of the world need.105
Nevertheless, electronic money also has drawbacks, which
have caused federal law enforcement agencies and the Treasury
Department to voice serious concerns about this new form of cur-
rency.  Most notably, the Treasury Department is concerned with
the potential use of e-money in “money laundering, offshore bank-
ing, and tax havens.”106 A Treasury Department report recently
warned that “technologies such as the Internet and electronic cash
could thwart the federal government’s efforts to conduct surveil-
lance of bank and credit card transactions.”107  Thus, the potential
effect of the widespread use of e-money is that law enforcement
may be unable to detect and prevent money laundering and other
serious crimes.
101 Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 91, at 278.
102 Id. at 275.
103 Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 299.
104 JAMES A. DORN, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF MONEY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2
(James A. Dorn ed., 1997).
105 See Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of
Money, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (1998).
The right to monopolize new, cost-saving forms of money and payment systems
has for centuries been guarded jealously by those lucky, powerful, or resourceful
enough to obtain it.  From gold coins to debit cards, market power by banks and
their clearinghouse organizations has combined with price coherence-the tendency
in some markets for competing products to transact at a single common price-and
Gresham’s Law to generate significant monopoly and profits.  Suppliers of money
and payment systems have taken advantage of transaction costs and vigorously
used vertical pricing restrictions, reinforced by statutes, to export onto others the
incidence of their market power, thereby facilitating and exacerbating the ex-
ploitation of that market power, increasing the harm to consumers, and stifling
competition between rival payment systems.
Id. at 359.
106 McCullagh, supra note 100.
107 Declan McCullagh, Feds: Digital Cash Can Thwart Us, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.
wired.com/news/print/0,1294,38955,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2002).
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2. The Outlook for E-Money
The commercial potential of e-money technology has spurred
many commercial entities to venture into the market.  Scholars
and commentators have suggested that electronic money could
“revolutionize the consumer market and eventually make tradi-
tional cash obsolete.”108  However, to date the e-money market has
not been successful in the United States.109  In fact, “electronic
money barely registers in terms of overall volume of [U.S.] pay-
ment transactions.”110  Some analysts estimate that in 2002, only
one percent of online transactions will be made using e-money.111
Understandably, the lack of consumer demand has caused
real problems for e-money providers.  A recent Wired News article
reported “[t]he electronic cash landscape is littered with the looted
corpses of companies that tried and failed to compete with credit
cards for online purchases.”112  The electronic currency market pio-
neer, DigiCash, was one of the first victims, having declared bank-
ruptcy in 1998.113  It sold its domain name and patents to eCash
Technologies, another electronic money company,114 which is hav-
ing troubles of its own.115  In fact, all of the early leaders in the
online money field are “either bankrupt or have gone through
complete overhauls.”116  This corporate bad news has not deterred
financial institutions and software developers in the United
States from embracing the promising technology and developing
new forms of e-money.117
108 Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 300.
109 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 12.  Various forms of elec-
tronic e-money are already available in a number of countries and have reportedly enjoyed
“relatively wide acceptance” in Europe and the Far East. Id.  Electronic money is report-
edly available in places like Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina,
Colombia, and other countries in Europe and South America. Id.; Welling & Rickman,
supra note 2, at 308.
110 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 22.
111 Show Me E-Money, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,
13277,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (Forecast made by Jupiter Communications).
112 McCullagh,, supra note 100.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.  In March  2001, eCash laid off twenty-five of its sixty-five employees. Id.
116 Noah Shachtman, Does P2P Fit Consumers’ Bill?, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.
wired.com/news/print/0,1294,36709,00.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
117 A number of U.S. banks and financial institutions have already developed, or are
currently developing a form of electronic currency.  Mark G. Tratos, Gaming on the In-
ternet, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 101, 110 (1997).  The Mark Twain Bank of St. Louis was the
first bank in the Untied States to offer electronic cash accounts. Id.  Both Visa and Ameri-
can Express are supporting the development of Internet currencies.  Rueda, supra note 71,
at 36.  Even the software giant Microsoft is apparently making plans to enter the electronic
cash market.  Microsoft was awarded a patent in June 1998 on technology, which allows for
anonymous electronic cash transactions.  Chris Oakes, MS Patents Anonymous Ecash,
WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,13277,00.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2002).  The Microsoft technology reportedly could allow consumers to make un-
traceable transactions on the Internet. Id.
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The market for e-money has struggled in large part because
Internet consumers have become comfortable using credit cards to
make online purchases.118  Because credit cards are not sufficient
for all forms of e-commerce, however, some demand has been cre-
ated for new forms of payment.  An example of a new type of pay-
ment system benefiting from increased demand is the “PayPal”
system.  This online payment system, launched by a Silicon Valley
duo in 1999, found an ideal application with the online market
and auction service eBay.119  PayPal offers the innovative service
of providing Internet users with a way to transfer money via e-
mail.120  The company struggled until early 2000, when customers
of eBay, which reportedly has 42.4 million registered users,
gained access to PayPal’s service.121  Before the advent of PayPal,
eBay customers generally had to pay for their online purchases by
sending a check via traditional mail.122  This process reportedly
added a week or more to individual transactions.123  When eBay
users realized that PayPal would allow them to pay or be paid
instantly by e-mail, they began flocking to the service.124  Al-
though PayPal had only about ten thousand users in 1999, the
number of registered users has grown to more than thirteen mil-
lion in 2002, and continues to grow.125
PayPal is not electronic money per se; however, its payment
scheme approximates the use of e-money.  It is therefore a good
indicator of the potential of e-money.  It is also a good example of
how e-money can thrive when coupled with a well-matched appli-
cation and consumer demand.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Feasibility of the UIGFPA
At first glance, it appears that the UIGFPA could be success-
ful at blocking access to Internet gambling through a credit card
prohibition.  As previously noted, most Internet gamblers fund
118 DigiCash Outta Cash, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,
16113,00.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
119 eBay claims to be the world’s largest online marketplace.  Its company overview
states that it was founded in September 1995, and is “the leading online marketplace for
the sale of goods and services by a diverse community of individuals and businesses.”
eBay, Company Overview, at wysiwyg://2/http://www.ebay.com/community/aboutebay/over
view/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).  “Today, the eBay community includes 42.4
million registered users, and is the most popular shopping site on the Internet when mea-
sured by total user minutes according to Media Metrix.” Id.
120 Adam Cohen, PayPal’s Big Play; An Online Payment Firm Rises from the Dotcom
Ashes, TIME, Feb. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8385732.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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their gambling activity with credit cards.  The underlying premise
of the UIGFPA is simple:  if Internet gamblers cannot fund their
online wagers with credit cards, then they cannot gamble.  The
burden of enforcing this monetary control scheme will fall on the
shoulders of credit card providers.126  Under the UIGFPA, any
credit card provider that knowingly processes a gambling transac-
tion could face both criminal and civil penalties.127  Moreover, the
UIGFPA would prohibit credit card providers from collecting the
gambling debts of customers who use credit cards to gamble on-
line.128  The threat of these penalties has understandably caused
concern among credit card providers.  One commentator has noted
that the UIGFPA “might motivate banks, wishing to avoid addi-
tional regulation and the threat of penalties, to try to pre-empt
passage [of the UIGFPA] by stepping up their efforts to reject
gambling transactions.”129  In fact, there is some indication that
the UIGFPA has motivated credit card companies to do this.
In 2002, credit card companies are reportedly rejecting online
gambling transactions at an ever-increasing rate.130  Two factors
appear to explain this trend.  The first factor is a rash of cases in
the United States by Internet gamblers seeking to have their
credit card debts, which they incurred while gambling online, de-
clared unenforceable as against public policy.131  Thus far, these
cases have been unsuccessful;132 however, they remain a cause of
concern for credit-card providers.  The second factor is the uncer-
tainty caused by the UIGFPA.  As a result of this uncertainty,
many credit card companies are processing fewer Internet gam-
bling transactions, and some credit card providers have com-
pletely banned the use of their credit cards for Internet gambling.
The result has been a corresponding drop in Internet gambling.133
The UIGFPA is already having an effect, without having been en-
acted. Thus, at first glance it appears that the UIGFPA could be
successful.
126 H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Matt Richtel, A Credit Crisis for Web Casinos: Card Companies Are Growing Wary
of Online Betting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at C1.
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., Internet Gambling Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468
(E.D. La. 2001) (where plaintiffs, who lost money to Internet casinos while using credit
cards to finance their wagers, sued credit card companies for injunctive relief, claiming the
debts were unenforceable); Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l. Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (W.D.
Wis. 1999) (plaintiff, who lost twenty dollars plus a $4.95 processing fee at an Internet
casino, sued his credit-card company and bank under RICO).
132 In re MasterCard, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 468; Jubelirer, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. But see
CABOt, supra note 3, at 288-89 (discussing Providian v. Haines, a California case, which
settled out of court).
133 Richtel, supra note 129.
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Nevertheless, two main factors will likely frustrate the suc-
cess of the UIGFPA.  First, Internet gambling is, by all accounts,
too popular with Americans to be eliminated without great diffi-
culties.  Second, alternative payment schemes are available to fill
the gap left by credit cards, some of which, such as e-money, are
based on technology that make enforcement of a ban impractica-
ble at this time.
The first factor that will frustrate the success of the UIGFPA
is that Internet gambling has become a very popular activity with
Americans.  The number of gamblers located in the United States
placing sports wagers or playing casino-style games at Internet
websites is estimated at over one million per day.134  Moreover, al-
though limited statistics are available on the total number of
unique visitors to gambling sites every month, one study placed
that number at 13.6 million for December 2001.135  The reality is
that Internet gambling provides the gambler with “an outlet for
sports gambling as well as casino-style gambling far beyond what
a local bookie can offer and far less expensive than a vacation to
Reno.”136  The consumers who enjoy this form of entertainment are
unlikely to suddenly refrain en masse from Internet gambling
solely because their chosen payment method will no longer work.
Americans have already shown that they will gamble, regard-
less of whether it is legal to do so.  The U.S. federal and state gov-
ernments have been incapable of preventing illegal gambling,
even before recent campaigns to prohibit Internet gambling
emerged.  Studies have shown that for every one dollar wagered in
United States with a legal sportsbook, another thirty-four dollars
are wagered with illegal bookies.137  The situation is no different
with Internet gambling.  As noted, the federal Wire Act makes
sports wagering over the Internet illegal.  Nevertheless, offshore
bookies take more money in bets on the Super Bowl than all the
sportsbooks in Las Vegas combined.138  Thus, it is readily apparent
that Americans are going to gamble, regardless whether it is legal
to do so.  If Americans are willing to gamble on sports, even when
it is clearly illegal, it logically follows that they will also continue
to participate in Internet gambling despite the UIGFPA, so long
as they can find an alternative payment mechanism to credit
cards.
134 Batt, Leach Takes Aim, supra note 21.
135 Leslie Walker, Gambling Sites Betting Heavily on Advertising, WASH. POST, Feb.
24, 2002, at H7, available at 2002 WL 13820521.
136 John Edmond Hogan, Comment, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of Internet
Gambling Regulation, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 815, 816 (1998).
137 Mike Roberts, The National Gambling Debate: Two Defining Issues, 18 WHITTIER L.
REV. 579, 602 (1997).
138 Ryan D. Hammer, Note, Does Internet Gambling Strengthen the U.S. Economy?
Don’t Bet On It, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 107 (2001).
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The second factor that will frustrate the success of the
UIGFPA is the availability of alternative payment methods to
credit cards.  Currently, there are a number of alternative pay-
ment instruments that Internet gamblers can use.139  However,
many of these traditional methods of transferring funds would
also be prohibited by the UIGFPA, including wire transfers,
checks, drafts, money orders, and other similar payment instru-
ments.140  Therefore, a key assumption underlying the proposition
that Internet gambling will continue despite the UIGFPA is that
Americans will find an alternative method of transferring funds to
Internet gambling sites, which the government cannot effectively
prevent.  These consumers have options.  In fact, even Represen-
tative Goodlatte, one of the sponsors of current legislation to pro-
hibit Internet gambling,141 has acknowledged that potential
alternative payment instruments to credit cards exist.142  Never-
theless, Goodlatte argued that the inconvenience to gamblers of
having to use alternative payment systems would solve “the larg-
est portion of the problem.”143  This view seems overly optimistic.
In fact, as a result of the recent initiative by credit card com-
panies to limit gambling transactions, Internet casinos and In-
ternet gamblers have already begun looking for alternative
payment methods.  Many Internet gamblers and casinos have al-
ready turned to “third-party credit card processors like SureFire
or PayPal” to continue using credit cards to place online wagers.144
These processors enable Internet gamblers to use their credit
cards at Internet casinos even if the casinos do not have a rela-
tionship with the bank that issued the credit card.145  This method
of payment is already in jeopardy, however, because companies
like MasterCard are implementing policies forbidding the use of
their credit cards at third-party processors for Internet gam-
bling.146  Moreover, this method of payment would also be made
illegal by the UIGFPA.147  Regardless, these recent efforts to cir-
cumvent the credit card companies’ self-imposed bans illustrate
that Americans will seek out ways to fund their online gambling
despite a legislated credit card prohibition.  Thus, the question to
be answered concerns how gamblers will transfer their funds to
139 Alternative payments systems could include: e-money, checks, wire transfers,
money orders deposited with the Internet casinos, credit cards issued by banks outside the
United States, etc.
140 H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001).
141 H.R. 3215, 107th Cong. (2001).
142 Leach Says, supra note 70.
143 Id.
144 Richtel, supra note 129.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001).
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Internet casinos.  The best prospect by far is anonymous electronic
money.
Although Internet gamblers rarely use electronic money for
payment at online casinos today,148 this could quickly change if the
UIGFPA is enacted.  Internet gamblers will look for alternative
payment methods, and they will likely have plenty of help in find-
ing them.  Unregulated offshore operators have no incentive to
prevent Americans from accessing their websites.  With billions of
dollars at stake, one can well imagine that innovative offshore op-
erators will provide their customers with a payment mechanism
consistent with the developing need.  Again, the most obvious
choice is anonymous electronic money.  An anonymous form of e-
money would be of great long-term benefit to offshore Internet ca-
sino operators, chiefly because e-money would ensure access to the
lucrative U.S. gaming market.
Arguably, the broad restrictions of payment mechanisms in
the UIGFPA could be interpreted to cover e-money.  Nevertheless,
because there are anonymous forms of e-money issued abroad that
can be purchased over the Internet, there is no practical way to
enforce a ban against the use of e-money for Internet gambling.
Accordingly, Americans wishing to gamble online can purchase e-
money over the Internet with a credit card, and then use it to
gamble at offshore sites, rendering any monetary control scheme
like the UIGFPA obsolete.  In addition to potentially rendering
the UIGFPA obsolete, e-money could actually bring about an in-
crease in Internet gambling.
B. The Unintended Consequences of the UIGFPA
1. The UIGFPA and E-Money Could Promote Internet
Gambling
Passage of the UIGFPA will likely promote e-money as the
payment method of choice for Internet gambling.  If e-money does
become the payment method of choice, there is the very real poten-
tial that Internet gambling will increase as a result.  As previ-
ously noted, Internet gambling is currently funded by “front
money” and credit card accounts.  These payment mechanisms
have been called an “impediment to the growth of the Internet
gambling industry.”149  There are a number of reasons for this po-
sition, including the fact that these methods of placing bets “lack
immediacy, security and anonymity.”150  E-money has the poten-
tial to remove these impediments.
148 See Anastasio, supra note 93, at 19.
149 CABOT, supra note 3, at 27.
150 Id.
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Gamblers generally “expect immediate payment of wagers”
when they win.151  Under the current credit card model, though,
gamblers do not have immediate access to their deposited funds
and thus have no way of knowing if the Internet gambling site has
credited their account until the gamblers actually request a with-
drawal of their funds.152  With e-money, however, “immediacy”
would no longer be an impediment to the growth of Internet gam-
bling.  A gambler would no longer have to wait for a check in the
mail or a charge back to his or her credit card or debit card ac-
count.153  Indeed, with e-money, gamblers’ winnings could be im-
mediately transferred to their personal computers.154  Thus, an
Internet gambling operation could configure its site to either
transfer winnings to a gambler after every win, or when the gam-
bler chooses to cash out.155
There are a number of other ways in which e-money would
improve the Internet gambling experience and thereby make it
more appealing to current and potential gamblers.  The fear of
fraud is another problem hindering the growth of offshore In-
ternet gambling operations.156  Documented cases exist of Internet
gambling operators who did not pay or return deposits or win-
nings to gamblers.157  Immediate payback could largely eliminate
this problem, and thereby make Internet gambling more attrac-
tive to potential gamblers.  The anonymity of e-money will also
make Internet gambling attractive to potential gamblers.158  Par-
ticularly troublesome to many Americans is the audit trail left by
their transactions with Internet gambling sites.  This trail leaves
gamblers open to possible charges of both illegal gambling and tax
evasion.159  With anonymous e-money, the government would have
little, if anything to trace.  As a final reason for its appeal to In-
ternet gamblers, e-money is less expensive than credit card
transactions.160
With immediate payoff, better security, anonymity, and lower
transaction costs, the benefits of e-money to the Internet gambler
cannot be overstated.  The functionality of e-money, combined
with these other benefits, would make Internet gambling much
more attractive to people inclined to gamble.  Moreover, even
those individuals previously deterred by the problems associated
151 Id. at 26.
152 Id. at 27.
153 Id. at 25-29.
154 Id. at 29.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 32.
157 Id.  The two operators were shown to have been involved with bank fraud, and both
were known to have associations with organized crime. Id.
158 Id. at 29.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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with credit cards and other payment methods might be persuaded
to try Internet gambling.
2. The UIGFPA Could Promote Money Laundering with E-
money
Commentators have repeatedly predicted that technological
development and the advent of online commerce would bring a
wave of new private and public electronic currencies.161  These
new currencies currently exist and are being further developed.
However, as noted, they have thus far been largely unsuccessful.
Consumer demand is the greatest factor in any commercial suc-
cess, including payment systems.  Congress’s proposed monetary
control scheme could create (and arguably already has created)
consumer demand for an alternative to credit cards, such as e-
money.  Moreover, with millions of Americans gambling on the In-
ternet every day, legislation such as the UIGFPA could very rap-
idly create the consumer demand necessary to facilitate
widespread use of electronic money.  As the PayPal/eBay example
demonstrates,162 development in the various needs of online con-
sumers will continue to strongly influence the design of future
electronic money systems.  As one commentator aptly stated:  “A
basic need of a society is money, the form of which adapts contex-
tually.  History, replete with examples, confirms that the evolu-
tion (or devolution) of monetary systems hinges upon the varying
needs of society.”163  The millions of Americans participating in In-
ternet gambling will need an easy to use and untraceable form of
payment to circumvent the UIGFPA.  E-money is exactly that.
Because the type of e-money that will eventually become stan-
dard in the marketplace could be heavily influenced by the
UIGFPA or similar monetary control scheme, serious considera-
tion should be given to the consequences that might flow from the
type of e-money the UIGFPA would unintentionally promote.  The
following discussion focuses on the potential negative conse-
quences of widespread use of e-money, including its use as a
money-laundering tool and its effect on the government’s power to
regulate.  This discussion is based on the premise that the
UIGFPA would promote an anonymous e-money system for the
Internet gambling market, which would act as a catalyst for the
proliferation of this form of e-money for other uses.
161 Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 91, at 274; Rotenberg, supra note 84, at 51.
162 See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
163 Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 59 (1996).
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E-money holds the potential for large-scale criminal use.164
The most obvious criminal use is money laundering.  The poten-
tial use of electronic money as a facilitator for money laundering is
enormous.165  Indeed, electronic money is ideal for money-launder-
ing purposes.  Millions of dollars can be stored on a laptop com-
puter or on a cellular phone with memory and can be transferred
anywhere in the world with the simple push of a button.166  The
transfer of funds takes only seconds167 and can be accomplished
with available anonymous re-mailers concealing the point of ori-
gin.168  Consequently, money launderers and other criminals could
pass millions of dollars worth of electronic money back and forth
around the world by computer Internet access or by cell-phone
calls.  Encryption-based e-money would achieve this result, while
avoiding U.S. banks and the financial transaction reporting
system.169
Electronic money has applications in all three stages of money
laundering, but the stages where it is most applicable are place-
ment and integration.170  In the placement stage, money launder-
ers could readily avoid the financial reporting systems because the
e-money could be laundered independently of the financial institu-
tions historically needed to achieve placement.171  Electronic
money could also be used to facilitate the integration stage of
money laundering.  Exporting large amounts of currency in elec-
tronic form to countries that have little or no money-laundering
controls and reintegrating it into the global economy could accom-
plish this integration.172
The most significant threat posed by anonymous e-money is
its potential to bypass traditional money-laundering controls.  As
noted, anonymous forms of electronic money do not leave a paper
trail.173  These anonymous forms of e-money, which can be ex-
changed multiple times in unrecorded peer-to-peer transactions,
are understandably the most troublesome for law enforcement.174
First, these forms of e-money can “facilitat[e] the money laun-
derer’s task by approximating the functionality of cash.”175  Sec-
ond, electronic money “moves along multiple channels largely
164 The Future of Money, BUS. WK., June 12, 1995, available at http://www.business
week.com/1995/24/b3428001.htm.
165 Id.
166 Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 311.
167 Id.
168 MOLANDER ET AL., supra note 80, at 19.
169 Rueda, supra note 71, at 86.
170 See discussion supra Part II.D.
171 Rueda, supra note 71, at 88.
172 Id. at 91.
173 Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 311.
174 CABOT, supra note 3, at 29.
175 Id.; Rueda, supra note 71, at 44.
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outside the established network of banks, checks, and paper cur-
rency overseen by the Federal Reserve.”176  This “disintermedia-
tion”177 removes third-party banks and other financial
institutions, which are subject to governmental oversight.178  The
removal of these “choke points,” which are used to regulate the
flow of currency, helps money launderers avoid traditional money
tracking methods.179  In sum, e-money is a money launderer’s
dream.
Not surprisingly, FinCEN views the development of technol-
ogy like electronic money as the single-largest potential money-
laundering threat.180  FinCEN currently estimates that less than
one percent of computerized money laundering is detected and
prosecuted.181  FinCEN’s view of electronic money is shared by a
number of legal commentators as well, some of whom have sug-
gested that the government consider placing broad-based restric-
tions on electronic money.182  In fact, the criminal potential for
electronic money is so great that a number of legal scholars be-
lieve that some governments will likely oppose the advent of pri-
vate currencies altogether.183  This solution may not be practical
for the United States, however, because such domestic restrictions
or regulations could be “undermined by the widespread availabil-
ity in the United States of electronic currency issued abroad.”184
Electronic money may “take off” regardless of what steps Con-
gress takes toward Internet gambling.  Congress should be very
careful, however, not to encourage an anonymous form of e-money
before it is prepared to deal with the consequences.  One scholar
noted that “[i]n many ways the foundation of the federal govern-
ment’s power rests on its prerogative to create and manipulate
176 The Future of Money, supra note 164.
177 Disintermediation removes the “choke points” though which illicit money generally
passes, effectively limiting governmental access to the information it needs to trace the
funds as they pass through financial institutions. MOLANDER ET AL., supra note 80, at 16.
178 Id.
179 See Rueda, supra note 71, at 4; see also MOLANDER ET AL., supra note 80, at 16.
180 Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 310.  In fact, FinCEN is so concerned with the
money laundering potential of electronic cash that it commissioned a think tank to produce
a study on the subject. See MOLANDER ET AL., supra note 80, at ix.
181 Welling & Rickman, supra note 2, at 316.
182 Id. at 327.  Welling and Rickman suggest that the government keep a number of
considerations “in mind.”  Some suggestions they make include:
[L]imiting the value of electronic cash that can be put on smart cards and In-
ternet-based accounts and limiting the number of peer-to-peer transactions.  More
importantly, the government should work to be sure (1) that electronic cash sys-
tems are engineered to produce an audit trail; (2) that the trail can be decrypted
on a showing of probable cause by use of the Clipper Chip; and (3) that the trail
can be followed by continuing efforts toward international cooperation.
Id.
183 Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 91, at 273.
184 Rueda, supra note 71, at 92.  One way to combat this would be through interna-
tional regulation involving multilateral efforts enforced by sanctions. Id.
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money—the medium of exchange.”185 The government may not
have the power to manipulate e-money.  Interestingly, the “very
feature that makes such monies threatening—encryption—may
make it impossible for governments to enforce [a] ban.”186  One
electronic money expert points out “[y]ou don’t need a nation-state
to do finance.  All you need is financial cryptography.”187  Accord-
ingly, anonymous electronic money has the potential to strip the
federal government of much of its power.
Clearly, money laundering would be greatly facilitated by the
proliferation of an anonymous form of e-money.  Moreover, the
government’s power to regulate or tax could be seriously impeded
by anonymous electronic money.188  Even the Treasury Depart-
ment has recognized these potential problems and is looking at
ways to combat them.189  With this in mind, Congress should take
a second look at the UIGFPA before deciding to enact it.  At the
very least, if Congress is compelled to regulate Internet gambling,
it should search out other methodologies and not encourage a form
of electronic money it cannot effectively monitor, let alone control.
Some form of e-money will eventually become commonplace and
will benefit society in many ways.  However, it is not clear
whether it will be an anonymous and untraceable form that will
eventually dominate the market.  Congress should play a role
(knowingly) in determining which type of electronic money takes
hold in the marketplace.  For the reasons set forth in this com-
ment, it should be apparent that electronic money, as anonymous
and untraceable as real cash, would be a regulator’s nightmare.
Nevertheless, this is exactly the type of e-money the UIGFPA will
promote.  Therefore, Congress and the President should examine
the issue very carefully before enacting the UIGFPA.
C. A Workable Solution
Both encryption and electronic money will eventually make it
impossible for the government to prevent Americans from gam-
bling via the Internet.190  The reality is that U.S. legislators op-
posed to Internet gambling are seeking to exercise control over a
borderless medium that is not within the control of the federal
government.  Such reality begs the question of what could and
185 Solomon, supra note 163.
186 Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 91, at 282.
187 McCullagh, supra note 100 (quoting Robert Hettinga, founder of the Digital Com-
merce Society of Boston and co-founder of the Financial Cryptography Conference).
188 The Future of Money, supra note 164.
189 McCullagh, supra note 100.
190 The technology of encryption is beyond the scope of this comment.  However, for a
good discussion of this topic see Christopher D. Hoffman, Note, Encrypted Digital Cash
Transfers: Why Traditional Money Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform Cryp-
tography Regulations, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 799 (1998).
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should be done regarding Internet gambling and money launder-
ing.  Two options are available: Congress can either continue to
try to pass a domestic prohibition on Internet gambling, or it can
legalize and regulate it.
A domestic prohibition will not likely have an effect on In-
ternet gambling as a money-laundering platform.  One scholar has
noted that “international cooperation is a prerequisite to any pre-
vention of money laundering through Internet casinos.”191  Fur-
thermore, because many jurisdictions have legalized Internet
gambling,192 international cooperation on this issue will be a diffi-
cult task.193  Without international cooperation, Internet casinos
will remain a money-laundering threat because, “[i]n order to de-
tect, and then prosecute, money laundering through on-line casi-
nos, law enforcement must be able to either monitor the
businesses for suspicious transactions, or periodically review their
financial records for such transactions.”194  Monitoring Internet
casinos would be impossible if gamblers are using anonymous e-
money, even if U.S. law enforcement had access to the financial
records of these offshore sites.
If the true purpose behind the anti-Internet gambling legisla-
tion were to hinder money launderers, then the legalization and
regulation of Internet gambling in the United States would be a
better solution than prohibition.195  A well-designed and well-regu-
lated Internet casino located in the United States would not be a
good vehicle for money launderers because all gambling transac-
tions could be recorded and readily traceable.  Credit cards,
checks, or money transfers could be used at the sites removing
consumer need for electronic money, and creating an audit trail
for law enforcement to monitor suspected criminals.  In addition,
even if e-money were used at domestic Internet casinos, other ver-
ification processes could be developed to identify the gambler.
Indeed, the best way to monitor suspicious currency transac-
tions is to “monitor” them.  If Internet casinos were located in the
United States, the federal and state governments would have the
191 Mills, supra note 65, at 86.
192 By 2000, fifty-five countries had legalized some form of Internet gambling. CABOT,
supra note 3, at 54.
193 See Mills, supra note 65, at 96-115.
194 Id. at 114.
195 This proposition assumes that Americans would choose to place their wagers and
gamble at a brand name, licensed, and regulated domestic casino.  This is a fairly safe
assumption given recent survey results showing approximately sixty percent of Americans
believe that offshore Internet casinos are fixed.  Lori Enos, Most Net Gamblers Say Fix Is
In, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2000, at www.osopinion.com/perl/4204 (last visited Mar.
26, 2002).  This proposition was also put forth by former director of the New Jersey Divi-
sion of Gaming Enforcement and Internet gaming expert, Frank Catania. Illegal Gam-
bling: Hearing on H.R. 556 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. of the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Frank Catania, Director of the New Jersey
Division of Gaming Enforcement).
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ability to do so.  The technology of computers, combined with com-
petent regulation, would likely enable an even greater level of con-
trol than that found in the traditional “brick and mortar” casinos.
If legitimate gambling enterprises in the United States were given
the legal right to open web-based casinos, then techniques and
safeguards could be designed to minimize the problems associated
with money laundering.
Admittedly, effective regulations and a regulatory process
would need to be developed to address legalized Internet gam-
bling.196  The complexities of this medium make regulation a
daunting task.  Nonetheless, a comprehensive legal framework
regulating domestic Internet gambling could develop standards
and license qualified entities to provide reliable and honest en-
tertainment for Americans.197  More importantly, regulation could
reduce criminal activities and other social costs associated with
Internet gambling.198
If Internet gambling operations are not allowed to exist le-
gally in the United States, American gamblers will continue to ac-
cess the offshore market.  This market is largely unregulated or
loosely regulated by foreign governments, representing a signifi-
cant and growing problem in online gambling.199  Because offshore
Internet gambling operations are not going to vanish, and the
United States government cannot effectively prevent Americans
from accessing these offshore sites, these operations will remain a
platform for money laundering.
Legalization of Internet gambling is the key to hindering
money laundering.  In fact, FinCEN concluded in a recent survey
that most countries subscribe to the position that Internet gam-
bling legalization with oversight and regulation is a “workable so-
lution” from economic and law enforcement standpoints.200  The
United States should consider this solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress’s monetary control scheme, as a method of dealing
with Internet gambling, will only produce an undesirable out-
come.  Unfortunately, as with so much legislation, outcome is less
important than appearance with the UIGFPA.  If the legislative
196 In fact, examples are already in place. See Frank Catania, Internet Gaming Regu-
lation: The Kahnawake Experience, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 209 app. (2002).
197 Some of the factors a regulatory scheme might include are:  background checks of
operators, prize payment bonding, cash reporting practices, random testing of games and
software to ensure fairness and compliance, licensing requirements, procedures to protect
against money laundering, prevention of underage gambling, methods to identify and help
problem gamblers, and tax revenue reporting practices.
198 Loscalzo & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 27.
199 See Kelly, supra note 21, at 117.
200 FINCEN, SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC CASH, supra note 69, at 51.
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motive behind the UIGFPA is really to thwart money laundering,
then legalization and regulation would be a far better method.
This proposition is, of course, only true if the regulation is sensi-
ble.  Legalization and regulation may not be a magic potion that
will cure all of the ills associated with Internet gambling.  Never-
theless, it is clear that legalized and regulated Internet gambling
in America would be far superior to the monetary control scheme
being considered by Congress.  Ultimately, the United States will
be forced to develop an appropriate policy toward Internet gam-
bling.  In doing so, the government will achieve, through legaliza-
tion and regulation, what it could not through prohibition.
Because the realities surrounding Internet gambling are so
strongly in favor of legalization, it becomes clear that the appro-
priate question is not whether it should be legalized and regu-
lated, but why it should not.
